WHAT IF BUSH INVITED SHARON AND ABU MAZEN TO CAMP DAVID?

WHAT IF BUSH INVITED SHARON AND ABU MAZEN TO CAMP DAVID?THE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE POST-ARAFAT ERA by Dore Gold and David Keyes

At President Clinton's failed Camp David peace summit in mid-2000, Barak offered more than any Israeli prime minister in history. Yet the talks exposed vast remaining disparities between Israel and many of today's post-Arafat Palestinian leaders on key issues that must be considered before the Bush administration dispatches a "presidential envoy" or risks convening yet another peace summit in the period ahead:

• Refugees: Several months after Camp David, Abu Mazen wrote: "The right of return means a return to Israel, not to the Palestinian state." As recently as January 1, 2005, Abu Mazen reiterated: "We won't forget the right of return of refugees who have been exiled from their land for more than half a century." "The right of return means a return to Israel, not to the Palestinian state," Abu Mazen wrote in the London Arabic daily al-Hayat several months after Camp David. Palestinian officials were, in fact, dismayed by President George W. Bush's statements about preserving Israel as a Jewish state, since they hoped that by flooding Israel with hundreds of thousands of Palestinians they would be able to demographically overwhelm its Jewish majority.
• Borders: The Palestinians insisted that the June 1967 line be the recognized international boundary and even demanded the Latrun salient, which includes a section of the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway. Additionally, the Palestinians rejected any Israeli sovereignty over national consensus suburban areas just beyond the municipal borders of Jerusalem, such as Maale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev. According to the notes of EU Special Representative to the Peace Process Miguel Moratinos from the Taba talks, the Palestinians "did not accept proposals to annex (settlement) blocs" to Israel.
• Jerusalem: Former Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami noted that Abu Mazen, who had a reputation for moderation, suddenly became energized at Camp David and rejected U.S. proposals for compromise on Jerusalem. At the end of the Taba talks, even the status of the Western Wall remained contested. According to Moratinos, the Palestinians acknowledged Israel's request for an "affiliation" with the Western Wall, but did not explicitly accept Israeli sovereignty over it.
• Security Arrangements: Israel requested early warning stations in the West Bank for security purposes and the right to deploy forces in the event of an Arab coalition attack from the east. The Palestinians insisted that no Israeli soldier be on any of their territory and also rejected Israeli control of air space. Mohammed Dahlan explained in Taba that the Arab world would not accept Israeli force deployments inside a Palestinian state that were aimed at other Arab states. Furthermore, the Palestinians made clear at Taba that they would not accept a demilitarized Palestinian state, either.
  

In 2001, Abu Mazen admitted, "Had the Camp David summit been convened again, we would have taken the same position" on the permanent status issues. Abu Ala, too, expressed no regret at any missed opportunity, asserting that he would not agree to what was offered at Camp David "even if it were to be proposed in another 100 years from today."

During the Oslo years, the explicit declarations of Palestinian leaders were often ignored and treated as statements for internal consumption alone. Wishful thinking was frequently substituted for hard analysis. This does not mean that in 2005 no "window of opportunity" exists; rather, its actual size must be accurately measured. Indeed, in the present context, a partial cease-fire or other limited arrangements are more realistic than significant progress on any of the substantive issues raised at Camp David in 2000.

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